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THE SOCRATIC BERGSON 
Perhaps the greatness of a great character is best to be seenin 
the multitude of analogies which it evokes; at  any rate, the 
quality of suggestiveness makes secure draft upon our garrulous 
human interest and certifies for its possessor some substantial 
d l .  More than any other man Bergson is the butt of our 
contemporary curiosity; and since Bergson is by profession a 
thinker, and since a thinker, unlike your h?an of deeds, is by ,  
profession never obvious, i t  becomes a matter of moment to 
discover just why he so touches us to the quick. The answer is 
indicated, I think, by a countryman of Bergson's, ~douard Le 
Roy, who has put the names of Bergson and Socrates in suggestive 
collocation. Immediately we grasp the analogy and guess the 
source of Bergson's suggestive power; for we remember Socrates' 
own image of himself as a gadfly rousing the noble but somnolent 
steed to action. We have been long lost in admiration of the 
mighty thews, the glossy flanks, the high carriage of our intellec- 
tual Pegasus; i t  has remained for Bergson to show him lumbering 
and scant of breath. 
" 'Know thyself' : the ancient maxim has remained the device 
of philosophy since Socrates, the device which marks at  least that 
initial moment where, bending toward the depths of the subject, 
it undertakes its proper work of penetration, whereas science 
continues a surface expansion. To this venerable motto each 
philosophy, turn by turn, has given a commentary and an ap- 
plication. But M. Bergson, more than any other, has pro- 
foundly renewed the sense of this, as of all that he touches." 
These are words with which M. Le Roy introduces his analogy, 
and assuredly they are words that merit some pondering by those 
who are in quest of the well-spring of that humanism which we 
carry back to the Greeks-too often, I suspect, with the lugu- 
brious conviction that it; was dried at the source. 
Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant,-yes, and Bagson: 
each of these men is great because he has sought to know k t  
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of all his own soul. And all, save as yet the last, have inspired 
great edifices of philosophy, which we count as the treasure- 
houses of human thinking. They are men of a type: pertinacious 
questors in their central realm, indifferent to the learning which 
makes our average pride, eager for some internal truth where 
others rest content with outward show, The knowledge which 
they seek bears the better name of wisdom; for it is never that 
illusion of intellect which dissipates itself in chimerical consump- 
tion of second intentions, but always an intimate intuition so 
bound to conduct that it can point the effective way to men's 
salvation. I t  is knowledge that joins to action; it is humanistic 
knowledge in the only true sense of humanism. 
Socrates, Xenophon says, would not dispute of that which the 
Sophists call " the world" nor yet of the laws which govern the 
movements of the stars; his interest was in human &airs, above 
all in justice and courage and temperance and wisdom. He 
"brought philosophy down from heaven," diverting men's 
attention from ~b ijv to zb iyaOdv, from ontology to morality. 
The world "below the Moon" was the world of his concern; and 
we must remember the sharp division which the ancients made of 
this sublunary realm; above the Moon is the region of motions 
eternal and incorruptible, below it is the domain not only of 
spatial change, of physical motion, but also of that change in 
time, generation and decay, of'which the Moon's own crescence 
and senescence is, so to speak, an image. @va.rdr 8va.coTat rpixer: ' 
surely mortal things befit mortality! and what is more truly ours 
than this precious transiency of love and birth and death? and 
what more alien to us than a Being transcendently aloof, whether 
in space or in thought, from alI the change and season of our days? 
All the ontological scheming and proclaiming of the pre-Socratics 
-what trivial matter it seems when the "midwife of souls" 
begins asking after the Good! 
In a recent number of the Revue Nh-Scolastique, an estirely 
devout Thomist asails the Bergsonian notion of time. "In 
reading the long and subtle developments given bythe author to 
this thesis" (the intuition of time), says M. Farges, "it is im- 
possible for a philosopher even a little familiar with the concep- 
tions of general metaphysics and of ontology not to be struck by 
the number and gravity of the confus'ons of ideas there en- 
countered. The most fundamental of our classic conceptions 
have been more or less emptied of their natural meaning, muti- 
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lated, topsy-turvied at pleasure, to such point of distraction as to 
seize with vertigo an inexperienced reader, If we may be per- 
mitted the expression, we would say-without wishing to impugn 
in the least the intentions of the author-that it is a veritable 
'sabotage' of ontology." Un vrai "sabotage" d'Ontologie! And 
our Thomist goes on to show-with what pious horror best leave 
to surmisethat Bergson has violated all the categorical conven- 
tions which make the philosophy of Aquinas the most categorical 
and conventional of all philosophies. Bergson will not play the 
dialectic ga rne the  essence of which is to concede the dialectic 
ontology. Was i t  not just so that Socrates shocked the "phy- 
sicians of ignorance''-Hippias answering questions of astronomy 
ex cathedra and Protagoras sulking because Socrates would not 
"sail on his sea of words, beyond sight of land?" 
Astronomy and dialectic are no doubt noble exercises, be- 
fitting the high court of philosophy; but it is God alone who can 
always geometrise. For mere mortals the urgency of conduct is 
fundamental in life; leisure for thought follows after; ethics is the 
essential science; ontology and logic are luxuries of the fortunate. 
And if at  times we lose ourselves in the fatuous game of abstrac- 
tion, forgetting the human scale of values and sacrificing our 
energies in hybristic attempts upon the empyrean, then surely 
the best gift of philosophy is a recall to the senses. "Socrates 
autem primus "-these are the famous words of Cicero-" philo- 
sophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus 
etiarn introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et 
rnalis quaerere. " 
The mind in search of analogies must surely be struck by the 
many analogies between pre-Socratic Greek philosophy and the 
philosophy called modem. Not a school of the one but finds its 
analogue in the other. The Milesian evolutionists could not 
have missed their kinship with Herbert Spencer, and ~b 9u~tp0\ 
is clearly cousin gerrnan to the " Unknowable. " Heraclitean 
flux and Sophistic scepticism find their parallels in modem sen. 
sationalism and the scepticism of Hume. The relationship of thc 
Pythagoreans to our mathematical physicists is as obvious a 
that of the Democritean atomism to our own prevailing materid- 
ism. The Eleatics are the veritable archetype of Germau 
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Absolute Idealism; and if Hegel is the modern Parmenides, we 
no less securely identify a modern Zeno in Mr. Bradley, who with 
triumphant dialectic reduces his master's teachings to absurdity. 
I need not~speak of the new school of Protagoras; they are every- 
where self-proclaiming. 
Plainly, the stage is superbly cleared for a modern Socrates- 
provided, of course, that we still have something to hope from 
philosophy; for to a certain type of mind the Greeks have long 
since pronounced the final philosophic dicta; henceforth human 
experience can but exemplify what they, in their primal wisdom, 
once for all enunciated. As Santayana expresses it-with an 
apodictic austerity which brooks no question-" the age of con- 
troversy is past ; that of interpretation has succeeded. " It 
seems to me that this is a familiar note; the gaunt and corded 
physiogrriomy of Medizval thinking rises before me, ascetically 
humble before the oracular Authority of the Past, but savagely 
intolerant of the plastic and vital flesh which alone can give the 
impress of character to what else must be but caricature of our 
essential humanity. The main difference is that where your 
Medizevalist lays his stress upon the omniscience of Providence, 
our classicists extol the omniscience of the Greeksand as the 
Greeks were undeniably human, $so fact0 their disciples are 
humanists (indeed, I should add the humanists). 
And human it is-to sigh for Saturn's golden reign, to remem- 
ber Paradise with tears,-for dreams such as these mark the 
unconquerable idealism of a race which, mired in the black and 
stinking present, must yet project its vision of perfection into 
some roseate dawn of life. But is it less human to look forward? 
Canaan, Utopia, the Celestial City, which we can strive for as 
well as innerly see,-are not these, too, humane? and because 
they are inspirations to effort as well as patterns of delight, 
should we therefore cast them forth? If contemplation is the 
only virtue, if action is necessarily base, I am one who is not 
ashamed to be reckoned in with the anthropologists-horrific 
folk who, remembering that the Greeks anointed their bodies 
with ointment from flasks of gracious form and delicate design, 
with the same thought recall the strong butter which enriches the 
shining beauty of the black African, and thank their benignant 
stars that creams and pomades are more reticent than of yore. 
Unquestionably Socrates would have enjoyed a voyage to  
Laputa. What a fine ironic speech he would have made about 
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it! But would he have discovered wisdom amid the star- 
gazers? "One man makes a vortex a11 round, and steadies the 
earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the 
earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in 
arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never 
enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior 
strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the 
world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing 
than the good;--of the obligatory and containing power of the 
good they think nothing and yet this is the principle which I 
would fa in  learn if any one would teach me. " 
I am not affirming that Bergson ishevery respect the Socrates 
of to-day. In many respects William James seems more nearly 
to hold the character--with his eager and many-sided inquisi- 
tiveness, his wilful insistence upon the concrete, his inability to 
see ideas other than as principles of action, his power to seize 
and inspire his fellow men. James is like Socrates in all this; 
but the Socrates of to-day is a temper rather than an individual; 
it is actuating the thought of many men, demanding of them that 
their philosophic search be a search after the good, and a good 
that shall be not an object of contemplation but a pattern of 
conduct. In F r a n c e a  nation whose social genius makes it a 
natural field for the Socratic spirit-this temper is most marked; 
and it is in France that Bergson has performed the needful and 
characteristically Socratic office of confuting the Laputians, 
The modern mind has been afflicted with a kind of spiritual 
astigmatism, impelling it to bifocalise the world from every angle 
of observation-"physical and psychical," "mechanical and 
teIeologicaI," " appearance and reality," all the nonsensical com- 
partmentalising which we have been accustomed to call philo- 
sophy,-and invariably, as it would seem, to make the worse 
choice of some cosmic Ansichf the measure of our wisdom. 
Bergson protests against this. He reminds us that discursive 
reason is a t  best but a preparation for more thorough under- 
standing, for completer sense, and that man's part is to know first 
of all his proper self. His "anti-intellectualism" gives much 
pious offense, but he seems to me only to be saying that genuine 
knowledge is humanly assimilable knowledge, vdr]at< rather than 
Brdrvota. "By intuition," he says, "is meant the kind of in- 
feUectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an obje& 
in order to coincide with what- is unique in it and consequently 
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inexpressible. Analysis on the contrary, is the operation which 
reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to objects 
common both to it and other objects. To analyse, therefore, is to 
express a thing as a function of something other than itself-" 
Is not this plain statement of plain fact? If it be not so, the 
fault Iies not in the fact stated, but in our own grotesque pre- 
possession with that celldarisation of the mind which we call 
psychology, wherein we seek to reduplicate by art the artificial 
cellulz into which we would compress the world. Plato1s was a 
better inspiration; from the world of Ideas we can come with 
ilIuminated eyes to the spectacle of materiality, but never from 
the material world can we surmise the nature of that being whose 
definition is power. As Bergson puts it, from intuition to 
analysis we readiIy pass, but from analysis to intuition never. 
From a different approach to the problem of knowledge Henri 
Poincar6 made quite as sharp a distinction of intuition from 
analysis as does Bergson; and for the same fundamental reason. 
"In mathematics," he says, "logic is called Analysis and to say 
analysis is to say division, dissection. It can have no other 
instrument save the scalpel or the microscope. Logic and intui- 
tion have each its necessary rble. Both are indispensable. 
Logic, which alone can give certitude, is the instrument of de- 
monstration ; intuition isthe instrument of invention. " This is 
' the distinction. The reason why it is radical Poincar6 states 
clearly in another connection, where he is contrasting the ana- 
lytic with the intuitive elements in our conceptions of spatial 
continua. After resuming the analytical definition of a con- 
tinuum of n dimensions (viz., " an ensemble of YZ co-ordinates "), 
he proceeds: 
" This definition makes a ready disposal of the intuitive origin 
of the notion of continuity, and of all the riches which this notion 
conceals. It returns to the type of those definitions which have 
become so frequent in mathematics since the tendency to 'arith- 
metise,' this science-definitions mathematically irreproachable 
but philosophically unsatisfying. They replace the object to be 
defined and the intuitive notion of this object by a construction 
made of simpler materials; one sees indeed that one can effect- 
ively make this construction with these materials, bu t  one sees 
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also that one can make many others. What i s  not to be seen is the 
deeper reason why one assembles these materials in just this, and not 
in another fashion. The ' arithmetisation' of mathematics is not 
a bad thing, but it is not all. l' 
Poincare diagnoses precisely the weakness that besets all 
abstractive thinking. In mathematics it is " arithmetisation " ; 
in philosophy-and, I suspect, a t  times in criticism-it is the 
scholastic passion for dichotomising. Over-conceptualisation, 
the word for the reality, the letter for the spirit-fascinated by 
the ease with which we can palm and shuffle the airy mintages of 
our intellect, we yieId to the gaming instinct and stake our all 
. . . only to lose, say PoincarC and Bergson, for truth is cast in 
the firmer mould of active experience. If philosophy stood for 
no more than mental dexterity, it would have been long perished. 
But a living philosophy means life, as Plato knew,-and in the 
Parmenides what lordly sport he made of your unredeemed 
dialectic ! 
The " arithmetisation " of mathematics, which Poincard con- 
trasts with " intuition," represents, I believe, the last stand in a 
process of regressive abstraction which has been going on since 
the Hellenes first formulated the idea of physical science. It 
is a process so apt of application that I would briefly resume it. 
The starting-point is figured by Archimedes' demand for a 
r a 6  o.cO from which to move the world. Such a ?FOG mir, such an 
immovable core of physical reality, seemed to the Greek physicists 
an essential of science. I t  is axiomatic, says Dercyllides, a 
truth "accordant with reason, " that in the Universe some bodies 
are mobile and some immobile; that all are either mobile or 
immobile is beyond reason. Greek physics was reared upon this 
assumption. The unmoving Earth was placed a t  the centre and 
about i t  the revolving panorama of the Heavens. The Pytha- 
gorean suggestion of an Earth and a Counter-Earth revolving in 
unison about a central fire is only a variation of this, for Hestia, 
the Hearth of the Cosmos, but takes the place of the unmoving 
Earth. Even the atomism of Democritus and Lucretius accepts 
the same principle; for while the Cosmos takes its form from the 
swirl of sweeping atoms, this is entirely because their motion is a 
gravitational, a d o m w a r d  flow: the universe possesses an "up " 
and a "down," a fixed spatial frame within which all motions 
can be measured and computed. 
The Greeks never passed beyond this conception; and indeed, 
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it is only to-day that we moderns-mainly under the guidance of 
PoincarGhave come to redise the fictive and conventional 
character of our formulation of the Cosmos as a function of 
absolute time and space. We have long been taught that 
Copernicus accomplished the great translation from the Old to 
the New; and in the field of morals (little as that was in his 
intention) this is near the truth, but I greatly doubt if the real 
life of his influence is not to be found in the stimulated interest 
in mechanical motions, which resqlted in Newtonian physics. 
Newton made definite once for aLl the conception of a frame of 
absolute time and absolute space within which all change could 
be reckoned. He carried to its consequence Greek astronomy. 
The material 7co6 m6, in its gross planetary form, disappears, but 
its place is taken by the hardy less material shape, spatial and 
temporal, by which all possible events are measured and cir- 
cumscribed. The cosmic stage is cIeared for the action, and it 
remains only for Laplace, with his nebular gyres, to complete the 
mise en s c h e .  
More effectually than any other, Poincard has pricked this 
bubble. The axiom of Dercyllides, which in Newton's thought 
is denied for everything excepting the empty frame of Creation, 
he has negated in toto. Time and space, he has shown, are as 
relative and fluxional as atoms and ions; they expand with our 
grandeurs and contract with our modestiesor at  least, we cannot 
know S they do not. To put it in other terms, there is a limit 
to our outer and physical knowledge, and that limit is set, not 
by the stations of the stars, b e  by our frail and changing human 
needs. 
And the "arithmeticians? " Blind to the fact that the central 
meaning of life must be the concrete experience of living, and step 
by step driven from the vivid cplots of the Greek naturalists, on 
through the welter of atomism, and thence out into the chill 
vacancy of absolute time and space-from this last resort ban- 
ished, they still pursue their restless process of standardisation in 
a chaos of abstraction so transcendental that there is nothing left 
to standardise. They seek a Station and a Frame, altogether 
oblivious of the fact that their sole content is a chimzera in vacuo 
bonabdnans. 
In a characteristic and eloquent passage Poincarb says : " Le 
continu physique est pour ainsi dire une ndbdeuse non rdsolue, 
les instruments les plus perfection116 ne pourraient parvenir A la 
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r&oudre; . . . c'est l'esprit seule qui peut la ~Lsoudre et c'est le 
continu mathhatique qui est la n4buleuse rkolue en Ctoiles. " 
The stars themselves are apparitions, singled by our limitations 
out of a Nature whose essence is fathomless to our gaze. 
From the ancient axiom of the mobile and the immobile, 
Aristotle derives a corollary of the utmost moment. "Evidently," 
he says, "those who say all things are a t  rest are not right, nor 
are those who say that all things are in movement. For if all 
things are at  rest, the same statements will always be true and 
the same always false. . . . And if all are in motion, nothing 
will be true, nothing false." In other words, the frame of the 
physical world is also the frame of the logical; truth and error 
lock step with time and space. 
The Greeks invented and Aristotle formulated logic. Like 
their mathematics it has proved a potent sharpener of the world's 
thought-but, as in the case of mathematical thinking, the blade 
is in some danger of being whetted to a nub. The "arithmetis- 
ing " of mathematics finds its parallel in the scholasticising of the 
intellect. In each case the error is that of identifying reason 
with the form rather than with the matter of intelligence, for- 
getting that what makes our thought living thought is not its 
power of abstract construction, but its intuitive ability to per- 
ceive why experience assembles its materials "in just this, and 
not in another fashion. " 
The Greeks were many things, but no one will deny that they 
were not philologists. For them speech was barbarous or 
Hellenic; and as speech, so experience. This has been the mis- 
fortune of logic, which in a large sense has been merely a refine- 
ment from Hellenic discourse. That it has adapted itself to the 
like-tempered tongues of western Europe is perhaps as much due 
to the autocracy of Hellenic thought as to their own native genius. 
In any case, the analytic tendency, fostered in Low Latin, and 
carried to its extreme in tongues developed under Latin patron- 
age is little more than the bitter exemplification of category and 
syllogism in their unredeemed application to human discourse. 
A highly inflected language like the Greek could sustain the 
syllogistic analysis without utter loss of life; but the lapidary 
zeal of the Scholastics, cutting, sawing, polishing their concepts 
THE SUCRATIC BERGSON 
to nicest exclusion and closest interlocking, has tended to convert 
our instrument of speech into a cunning mosaic rather than the 
fluid reflection of thought; it is, as Plato might say, "thrice 
removed from the king and from the truth."x 
The consequence to modern speech has been to make it hard 
and mechanical; language has become an index rerum, a kind of 
notation of experience, whose curious affinity to mathematical 
notations is hourly bringing mathematics and logic into more 
indiscriminate communion. Undoubtedly for practical affairs, 
for business, analytic speech is the most efficient human instru- 
ment ever created,-but the walls of the counting-house are not 
yet the pillars of the firmament; to the business of living there 
is to be added the art of living well. Our danger is a mere 
external fascination in the click and glitter of our highly polished 
verbal machine; so that our thinking resolves into a drone of 
Aves and Paters, each told by an undeniably solid bead and 
each devoid of all spiritual sign5cance. The most horrible 
monument I have ever beheld is the Mormon temple in Salt 
Lake City; it is built with deadly symmetry of line and angle, 
every joint conspicuous and every unit in relief,--exactly as a 
child might build with blocks; and what makes it so horrible is 
just that it is infantile in conception and monstrous in size, the 
work of beings in stature men, who had yet never been able to 
put away childish things; we get from it the veryshiver which the 
deeds of the Cyclopes gave the Greeks. Under the stringency of 
a logic which was no doubt a valuable criticism of a more plastic 
speech, our modern discourse, and the thought of which it is the 
image, tends constantly to sink into a like monstrous infantilism. 
Aristotelian logic in its iron demand that words shaU have that 
constancy of meaning-conceived by Aristotle as a sort of con- 
ceptual essencewhich they never have in living speech, has 
constructed for the intellectual world a kind of frame, analogous 
to that established by Greek mathematics in the physical realm, 
with the principle of identity for its xoir mQ. It has enabled 
rigid thinking, but in substituting concepts for intuitions i t  has 
too often purchased elegance at a cost of sincerity and power. 
There is another form of expression, belonging to barbarous 
'A crisp presentation of the relation of thought to language is A. D. Shef- 
field's Grammur and Thinking, esp. the section on "Analytic and 1nflec.ted 
Speech," while Aristotelian logic is exuberantly pilloried in F. C S. Schiller's 
Formd Logic. 
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tongues, disdained of the Greeks, which it is worth while to hold 
in mind if only that we may gauge the distance we have travelled. 
Polysynthesis or holophrasis, it is called, and a pertinent example, 
which I borrow from Jane Harrison, is the Fuegian mamihlapi- 
nu.tu@zi "looking-at-each-other, -hoping-that-either-will-offer-to- 
do-something-which-both - parties - desire - but - are - unwilling - to - 
do." The vital situation is the thing designated (if " thing " it 
may be called), the expression being moulded to suit just this, 
and not any possible, mutuality. If speech can hit off intuitiont 
we can hardly imagine an apter conformity. 
The so-called "anti-intellectualism1' of Bergson is nd more 
than a fundamental insistence that experience is primarily holo- 
phrastic. His criticism of the logomachies of the concept- 
mongers, his asseveration that the test of reason is intuition, 
above all his contention that la dude  rdelle, gathering in itself 
before and after, is the focus of reality, all this is but his studied 
protest against the artitice and inconsequence of our mental 
legerdemain. He is telling us-what we have often suspected- 
that the human spirit is never garrulous nor elegant in its tense 
moments of growth, but is rather awkward and stammering, 
frail of speech but gifted with a power more than of tongues to 
stir in men's hearts a responsive understanding. What, I wonder, 
would become of our tragedies, and the living strength of them, 
save for that energy of situation and action which always a t  the 
last outpasses the eloquence of words? . 
The lifelessness, the dramatic sterility, with which themathe- 
matical method has invested the physical universe is the butt 
of Poincare's criticism. The similar lifelessness and dramatic 
sterility with which our philosophy has been infected is the object 
of Bergson's attack. In each case the disease--which might well 
be called the fallacy of the "dividing intellect1'--is of Greek 
origin, though arithmetisation and concept-polishing have 
alike gone far beyond the surmise of any Greek;-and that the 
disease is one and the same is well enough evidenced by our 
contemporary blurring of the boundary between logic and mathe- 
matics,--an identical bent is leading to identical conclusions.' 
"Mathematics as a science commenced when first some one, probably a 
Greek, proved propositions about any things or about some things, without 
specification of definite particular things." A. N. Whitehead, I?alroducfion 
to Mathematics. Fons et origo of Iogic and mathematics are thus explicitly 
identified. 
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Bergson and Poinear6 have each ministered to our ailment, 
starting respectively from its inner and its outer symptoms, but 
finding an identical cure in their critiques of our apprehensions 
of time and space, with the single implication of the primacy of 
intuition. Thus at last the T O G  orG-whether of Archimedes or 
Aristotleis rightfully banished to the realm of illusion. 
As for the reputed "mysticism " of Bergson's notion of time, 
of kz durke rrblle, I may best reply by citing the naive antagonism 
of my excellent Thomist. "At first glance," he says, "it would 
seem subtle and indeed paradoltical to wish to found a whole 
. philosophy upon the notion of Time. But upon reflection, and 
especially remembering the marvellous Peripatetic synthesis 
entirely erected upon the notion of Movement-a concept so 
heighboring that of Time, one is tempted rather to give credit 
to the author,-not to be sure, without some misgiving, for if 
Movement is a phenomenon patent to the senses, this is not true 
of Time, the most obsmre and mysterious perhaps of all natural 
phenomena. This contrast was indeed already remarked by the 
ancients when they said, 'Motus sensibus ipsis patet, non autem 
tempus.' Hence we may very reasonably fear that sophism 
could find naught more easy than to conceal itself amid these 
profound shades, and that in place of building upon a rock, as 
Aristotle, M. Bergson erects his house upon the shi£ting sands of 
conjecture." Proceeding, he quotes Aristotle's dehition of time 
as the number of motion in relation to before and after, Lpcflybs 
xrvrjmos x a ~ &  rb T Q ~ T E P O V  xai iIor~pov, adding in comment: "This 
definition has regard for the time whkh measures. As to 
the time which is measwed, it is no other than movement, in 
that it falls under the measure of the before and after. It is the 
same distinction as that of the numbering number and the num- 
bered number, r b  +pr8p4pevov, r i  trpr0yy~dv." 
Truly, a completer justification of Bergson's intention could 
not be required. Bergson had diverted attention from the 
numbering to the numbered; he has recalled us from the formal 
measure to the reality which is measured; and he has given us 
to see that that reality is itself a movement which outruns all 
our measures in its creative evolution of a world. Ontology 
destroyed is cosmology redivivus. 
HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. 
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